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Introduction
Research has supported this notion. Interrupting people while they are deciding if a smile is true or false creates a truth bias (Gilbert et al., 1990, Study 2) , and time pressure similarly increases the likelihood of believing information (Gilbert, Tafarodi & Malone, 1993) . Also, to analytically assess a message enough information must be available; this information may be absent if the message is too short. Because of these reasons, the truth bias should be more pronounced with shorter processing times.
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Typically, in deception detection research, videotaped truths and lies are shown to observers who have to immediately judge whether each sender in the videotape is lying or telling the truth. Masip, Garrido, and Herrero (2006 , 2009 , 2010 observed that in many studies the video clips are so brief and potentially uninformative that analytical processing may not happen. They reasoned that this might explain why deception research has typically found a truth bias. Masip et al. conducted two studies in which people watched a video recorded mock crime and then lied/told the truth in answering three questions about the crime. Their answers were videotaped and subsequently shown to raters. The raters judged each speaker's honesty after each of the three responses, aware that any given speaker either always lied or always told the truth across the three responses of their statement. Consistent with a heuristic account, raters were truth biased when judging the speaker's first response, but became less biased when judging the second and third responses.
Although Masip et al. (2010) acknowledged that their results are open to alternative interpretations, they favoured the HAM interpretation. Here we first considered whether the change in bias could be explained simply as a change in the speaker's behaviour, rather than having anything to do with the cognitions of the rater. Having found support for a cognitive account of the bias (Experiment 1), we then moved on to more closely examine two competing cognitive accounts, namely HAM-based (Experiments 1-3) and step-by-step (Experiments 3-4) response mode explanations.
Account 1: Behavioural Explanation
Labelling excessive truth responding as a "bias" implies it is an erroneous tendency of the rater. Yet the truth "bias" may not be a cognitive bias, but a valid inference made from the available behaviours. That is, it is not the raters who become less truth-biased, but THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 6 rather the speakers who give off cues that appear less honest. For instance, liars may conceivably become more nervous over time or display suspicious behaviours. Truthtellers, generally confident that "the truth will come out" (Kassin, 2005; Masip & Herrero, 2013) , may not. In this case, truth-tellers' behaviours would appear honest across their statement whereas liars would become increasingly unconvincing. This could explain the phenomenon of the truth bias declining over time.
To begin to support a heuristic-analytical account, we had to show that the decline in truth bias occurs independently of the senders' behaviour, i.e., that there is a cognitive component to the bias. We adopted Masip et al.'s (2009) paradigm. Observers watched video-recorded speakers giving three consecutive truthful or deceptive responses to an interviewer's questions. Observers had to indicate whether each speaker was lying or telling the truth after watching each of the three responses. It is important to note the presentation order (order in which each speaker's responses were shown to raters) in Masip et al.'s studies was the same as the recording order (order in which the responses had been recorded). We reversed the presentation order in one condition so that the last recorded response was viewed first and vice versa. The behavioural account predicts that in the reverse order the truth bias should increase over successive judgments because speakers would appear more honest in their first recorded (last presented) response. The cognitive account predicts that the bias should decline irrespective of condition.
Account 2: Heuristic-Analytic Account Masip et al. (2006 Masip et al. ( , 2009 found a decline in the truth bias between each of three speaker's responses. Although the judgment number (1st, 2nd, 3rd) is a proxy of viewing time, some speakers provided lengthy responses whereas others were shorter, and so it is an inaccurate proxy. Analytic processing should intervene at a given time, not after a given THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 7 number of ratings: the analytical process either takes longer to engage (defaultinterventionist models) or longer to complete processing (parallel-competitive models) (Evans, 2007) . For this reason, we examined the following two issues:
(a) How the total amount of processing time available (i.e., the cumulative speaking time until the end of the third response) influenced bias and accuracy.
(b) How the duration of the first presented response influenced bias and accuracy.
This was examined because if the speaker's initial response is particularly long, raters may shift to analytical processing during the first response.
To support a HAM account, the truth bias should decrease and accuracy should increase when there is greater time to process information.
Account 3: Step-by-Step Response Mode
If processing time cannot explain the decline in bias, but judgment number can, then it must be the very act of making multiple judgments that has a causal effect in the decision process. Granhag and Strömwall (2001a) showed that raters who made a judgment after watching an interview and another judgment after watching two subsequent interviews were more accurate than those who only made a single judgment after watching all three interviews. Importantly, in these two conditions the total viewing time was identical. The authors explained the improved accuracy in terms of assessment through a step-by-step response mode (making repeated assessments of veracity) instead of an end-of-sequence response mode (making just one final assessment). By reflecting on previous decisions in light of new information, observers using a step-by-step response mode could attain greater accuracy.
By examining the impact of viewing duration on truth judgments and accuracy, we also sought to test the influence of judgment time separately from the act of making a THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 8 judgment. To support a step-by-step response mode account, a decline in biased responding should be evident across the multiple ratings, but it should be independent of the time the rater had to process the information.
In summary, we addressed three potential explanations for the decline in truth judgments across a speaker's statement. The first explanation proposes it may be that speakers appear more deceptive over time (the behavioural account), meaning the bias shift is attributable to speakers' actions, not to the raters' processing style. If there is a cognitive component to the bias, there are two additional explanations. The second, currently favoured explanation is that the truth bias reflects a shift from heuristic to analytical processing (the HAM account). In this case, the decline should be related to the amount of processing time available. The third explanation suggests it is the act of making multiple judgments that causes the decline in bias (the step-by-step account).
EXPERIMENT 1
In line with Masip et al. (2006 Masip et al. ( , 2009 Masip et al. ( , 2010 and with a cognitive account of the bias, we predicted: 
Materials
The video stimulus set was adopted from Masip et al. (2006 Masip et al. ( , 2009 Further details can be found in Masip et al. (2006) . The first recorded response lasted on average 50 s, Response 2 averaged 37 s and Response 3 averaged 39 s. Duration differences were not statistically significant, F (2, 35) = 0.26, p = .776, η p 2 = 0.01.
Two versions of Video Set A1 were created. In the first version (used in the direct viewing condition) the three responses of each speaker were presented in the same order in THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 10 which they had been recorded. In the second version (used in the reverse viewing condition) the speaker's third recorded response was presented first, followed by the second recorded response, and then by the first one.
Design and Procedure
Participants were allocated randomly to the direct (n = 44) or reverse viewing condition (n = 39). Sex and age distributions did not differ substantially between conditions. The procedure replicated Masip et al.'s (2009) , with the exception of the viewing direction manipulation.
Groups of participants took part in two sessions per condition. They were apart so they could not see each other's responses. Instructions explained they would see 12
speakers, that each speaker provided a single statement based on a videotaped event, that each statement consisted of three responses, and that a statement was either deceptive or truthful across the three responses. After each response, the video was stopped and the participants marked in a booklet their lie-truth judgment and their confidence (on a 1-to-7 scale, with higher values indicating more confidence). Raters were explicitly told that in judging each speaker's 2nd or 3rd response they were free to either make the same judgment or to change it if they changed their opinion. In analysing the data we examined the changes in the raters' judgments across the three responses of each sender, not across different senders, statements, or topics. In other words, the primary independent variable was the speaker's response (1st, 2nd, 3rd), not statement number (1 through 12).
The PJT and accuracy scores were the dependent variables. These measures are typically used in lie detection research. But because they share variance, we also used nonparametric signal detection measures B" D and A' to measure the effects of response bias and accuracy independently of each other (see the Appendix for more information).
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Greenhouse Geisser corrections were used in all instances where assumptions of sphericity were violated.
Results

Testing the Behavioural Account
Two 2 revealed no significant effects on accuracy.
We wanted to make sure the lack of a Presented Response x Viewing Direction interaction on the PJT reflected the real absence of an effect rather than a lack of statistical power. We calculated a Bayes Factor using a Cauchy prior distribution with a scaling factor for the fixed effects of 0.5 over the standardised effect sizes, and a scaling factor of 1.0 for the nuisance variables. We compared a complex model with the Presented Response x
Viewing Direction interaction with a simpler model without this interaction (see the THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 13 Appendix for motivation of the scaling factor and for details on model specification). The analysis revealed that in order to prefer the more complex model we would need prior odds favouring it greater than about 45. This strongly supported the true lack of an interaction effect. A Bayes factor calculated in the same way for accuracy scores revealed that the data were 100 times more likely under the null hypothesis.
Summary. The bias decreased over successive judgments regardless of whether the statements were presented in the recorded order or in the opposite order, suggesting the decrease cannot be explained by changes in the speakers' behaviours over consecutive answers.
Testing the Default-Interventionist and Parallel-Competition Models
Because the data were not easily amenable to traditional F-tests, a model comparison approach was used to assess the effect of cumulative viewing time on bias and accuracy.
Two generalised logistic mixed-effects models (GLMEMs) were created, one with all the manipulated variables and the other additionally including the fixed effect of Cumulative Viewing Time. A significant difference in the predictive ability of these two models would indicate that the addition of cumulative viewing duration significantly improved the fit of the data. It did not, neither for the PJT, χ 2 (1) = 0.03, p = .861, nor for accuracy, χ 2 (1) = 1.22, p = .290. The simpler model without viewing time is preferred.
Similarly, the duration of the first presented response could predict neither the PJT, χ
2
(1) = 0.77, p = .381, nor accuracy, χ 2 (1) = 0.67, p = .411, in judging that response.
Discussion
Experiment 1 established the change in bias is attributable to the rater, not to a change in the speakers' behaviour. Consistent with both HAM and step-by-step response mode explanations, there was initially a high truth bias that decreased over successive judgments, THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 14 regardless of the order the responses were presented. Overall accuracy did not change over ratings.
Is the decrease in bias caused by the act of making multiple judgments (step-by-step account), or by the amount of time raters have to process the information (HAM account)?
Consistent with research in persuasion (Thompson et al., 2003; see also Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1993 ) and contrary to a time-based HAM, processing time could not predict how likely people were to believe speakers were telling the truth; thus, it appears that the act of rating over several occasions reduces the truth bias. However, the present findings do not allow us to dismiss HAMs altogether. We must consider a third class of HAMs identified by Evans (2007) , pre-emptive conflict resolution models.
EXPERIMENT 2
Pre-emptive conflict resolution models do not propose that analytical processing will be seen only late in the judgment process. Instead, they propose a "decision" is made at the outset as to whether heuristic or systematic processing will be used (Evans, 2007) .
Different communication channels make different demands on cognitive resources, thereby making heuristic or analytic processing more likely. Visual cues are easier to process and require fewer cognitive resources; therefore, they can be processed heuristically (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008 , 2010 Stiff et al., 1989) . Verbal cues require greater cognitive resources (Gilbert & Krull, 1988) ; therefore, analytical processing is needed to process these cues (Chaiken, 1980; Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2010) . If the truth bias results from heuristic processing, then visual cues should yield more of a truth bias than verbal cues (Burgoon, Blair & Strom, 2008) . Further, because analytical processing takes a systematic approach towards forming judgments, accuracy should be higher when THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 15 verbal cues (processed analytically) are available (Reinhard, 2010; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008) .
We tested whether the findings from Experiment 1 would change depending on the communication channel. Data from the direct-viewing, audio-visual condition of Experiment 1 were compared with data from similar participants with access to only visual (video condition) or only audio (audio condition) information from the same videotape.
Consistent with HAMs, we predicted that:
(a) More truth judgments would be made in the video (because heuristic processing would be engaged) than in the audio condition (systematic procession), with the audiovisual condition located between these.
(b) Accuracy would be lowest in the video condition and highest in the audio condition.
(c) The decrease in truth judgments would be weakest in the video conditionbecause switching to systematic processing would be difficult with no revealing verbal information available-and strongest in the audio condition.
(d) Accuracy would increase over consecutive judgments primarily in the audio condition, but not in the video condition.
Method
Psychology undergraduates were allocated to the video (n = 22; 15 female; age M = 20.55, SD = 4.18), audio (n = 27; 17 female; age M = 20.33, SD = 2.24) or audio-visual conditions (n = 24; 15 female; age M = 20.21, SD = 2.32; data of these participants came from Experiment 1; they were in the first group in the direct-viewing condition). Sex and age distributions did not differ between the groups.
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The procedure closely followed Experiment 1, except for the modality manipulation and the fact that only the direct viewing direction videos were used.
Results
Truth Bias
A 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 3 (Response: 1st/2nd/3rd) x 3 (Channel: video/audio/audio-visual) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first two variables was run on the PJT. The PJT decreased over successive ratings F (1.74, 121.55) = 7.10, p = .002, η p 2 = .092 ( (1) = 1.21, p = .272.
Discussion
There was little support for a heuristic processing account of the truth bias: accuracy and bias were similar across all three cue-type conditions, and changes over successive ratings did not match HAM-based predictions (Evans, 2007) . Also, the truth bias did not decline with longer viewing times, as would be expected by the two classes of HAM that claim a shift from heuristic to analytical processing over time. Equally, accuracy could not be predicted from viewing time, with the only exception of the audio condition. This latter THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 18 finding may look consistent with an HAM, but HAMs explicitly predict a reduction in bias when switching to analytical processing; this was not supported across Experiments 1 and 2.
The present findings question both the behavioural account (Experiment 1) and the HAM account (Experiments 1 and 2), and are consistent with a step-by-step account: it is the number of judgments made, not the amount of processing time, what explains the shift in bias. In Experiment 3, we directly contrasted the predictions of the HAM and the stepby-step accounts.
EXPERIMENT 3
According to a HAM, when using very short clips bias would be high and accuracy low because time is needed for an analytical process to run to completion. For instance, interrupting participants' processing leads to truth biased responding (Gilbert et al., 1990) , potentially indicative of heuristic processing. But according to a step-by-step account there should be a progressive decrease in bias regardless of whether the clips are long or short.
In Experiment 3, we used short (8 s) segments of each of the senders' responses. If the decrease in bias is detected with 8 s responses, this will be the result of making repeated judgments rather than of switching from heuristic to systematic processing. We also used a long clips control condition.
Method
Eighty-two undergraduates (63 female; age M = 19.29, SD = 3.22, range 18 -36 years) participated in this experiment in the context of a Social Psychology lecture.
Materials and Procedure
The booklet and stimulus material used in Experiments 1 and 2 were employed. The A Bayes factor with all the variables in the preceding ANOVA revealed that in order to prefer a model with the interaction term over a model without it we would need prior odds greater than 2.9 favouring it. This offered moderate support for the null hypothesis of no interaction effect, supporting the step-by-step account.
Accuracy
Another In summary, response bias decreased across rating points, and clip length did not moderate this effect. Clip length influenced accuracy rates: with 8 s clips mean accuracy was below .50; longer viewing durations increased accuracy to approximately .60.
Discussion
The HAM claims analytical processing is slow and requires more time than heuristic processing (Evans, 2007) . However, we found bias decreased over ratings, regardless of whether raters watched short or long clips. These findings support a step-by-step process.
Interestingly, accuracy increased for short clips (in particular from the first to the second response) but not for long clips. There are at least two explanations for the increased accuracy and reduced bias in the short clip condition. The raters may have switched from heuristic to systematic processing at some point between 8 s and 16 or 24 s. Alternatively, the low accuracy rate at the first rating point for the short clips condition may simply reflect that there was not enough information available at this point to make a reasoned judgment.
Additional information provided during the second 8 s response may have permitted an increase in accuracy without necessarily reflecting a shift in processing modes. The thin slices were used to prevent switching to analytic processing claimed by Masip et al. (2009) to require statements longer than 30 s, but we cannot rule out the possibility of analytical processing. However, because bias, our primary prediction arising from the HAM, could not be predicted by clip length, a non-HAM based account is preferred.
In any case, it is clear that a HAM account cannot explain the decrease in bias for long responses. If there is any switch between heuristic and systematic processing, it happened at some point between 8 and 32 s. The mean duration of the entire first response was 50 s, meaning analytical processing should already have been engaged and so a decrease in bias should not be seen. Therefore, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the HAM account cannot explain the decrease in bias. Instead, the data support a step-by-step process account. In Experiment 4, we considered a mechanism that could explain why step-by-step responding has this effect.
EXPERIMENT 4
Masip et al.'s (2009) study and Experiments 1 through 3 here evidenced a decline in truth bias between the first and second response, but no further decline. Why would stepby-step responding lead to this effect?
When a speaker makes multiple responses, it is possible to compare them. Raters use consistency more often than any other cue when comparisons can be made (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999 , 2000a , 2001b . Consistency seemed a plausible candidate for explaining the decline in truth bias over time. Because raters perceive inconsistencies even when they are not present (Granhag & Strömwall, 2001b) , raters could shift their judgments towards deception. Having established inconsistency between the first and second response, there may be no additional effect of continued perceived inconsistency by the third response.
Thus, we predicted a greater decline in the PJT between the first and second response for speakers perceived as inconsistent than for those perceived as consistent. 
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Procedure
Consistency raters received an instruction sheet with definitions of verbal consistency, "the extent to which the same details or similar details are repeated over the responses with no contradiction", and nonverbal consistency, "the extent to which the same behaviours or similar behaviours are repeated over the responses". They watched Video Set A1 and provided ratings of verbal and nonverbal consistency for each speaker after viewing two responses, and then again after viewing all three responses. Ratings were given on a 1
(Not consistent at all (Inconsistent)) to 7 (Fully consistent) scale.
Consistency. The consistency ratings were used to median split the clips as high or low in consistency within each of the 2 (channel: verbal/nonverbal) x 2 (rating point: after the second (t 2 ) or third (t 3 ) response) cells. Ratings across the verbal and nonverbal THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 23 channels were highly correlated. Cronbach's alphas were calculated separately for each of the Consistency x Rating Point x Veracity cells, and ranged between .90 and 1.00.
Therefore, ratings were collapsed across channels.
Coding. Truth judgments were coded as 1 and lie judgments as 0. Then, the change in the PJT was calculated as the judgment at the second (or third) response minus the judgment at the first response. A shift from a truth (1) to a lie (0) 
Consistency use
Three 2 (Consistency: low/high) x 2 (Veracity: truthful/deceptive statement) x 2 (Rating Time: t 2 /t 3 ) within-participants ANOVAs were conducted on the PJT change. 1 The first ANOVA was conducted on Masip et al.'s (2009) data, the second on the data of Experiment 1, and the third on the ratings of Experiment 3's full-length clips. The main effect of consistency was significant in all the three ANOVAs (Table 3; more detailed results are available from the first author). A meta-analysis of all three experiments yielded a weighted Hedges's unbiased g = -0.51, 95% CI [-0.73, -0.29] , z = 4.46, p < .001, which is a medium effect size (Cohen, 1988) . A homogeneity analysis showed that the sample of THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 24 effect sizes was homogeneous, and hence variability was caused by sampling error alone, Q = 2.37, p = .31. In short, across the three studies consistency had a substantial impact on the decrease in the PJT (see Figure 1 ).
Consistency ratings were collected separately for verbal and nonverbal behaviour. We In summary, the analyses of several studies and experimental conditions provide compelling evidence that consistency guides veracity judgments across multiple responses of the same sender. Verbal consistency may contribute more to this effect than nonverbal consistency.
Importantly, we do not claim that a consistency step-by-step account is necessarily orthogonal to a HAM account, but rather that the HAM account failed to explain the truth bias in three experiments and that the step-by-step account received support in all reported experiments.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In making lie-truth judgments, raters show a bias towards believing (Bond & DePaulo, 2006) . One line of research suggests that this truth bias is produced by a system that initially is biased towards believing with the short 30 s clips typically shown to lie THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 25 detection raters, but with longer statements may use a more effortful evaluation (Masip et al., 2006 (Masip et al., , 2009 (Masip et al., , 2010 ; see also Gilbert, 1991) . We tested the claims of these heuristicanalytic models (HAMs) as presented by Evans (2007) .
We first considered whether the shift in judgments is a result of a shift in behaviour over the course of lengthier statements rather than the product of the rater's processing. The behavioural account was not supported. We then considered a stringent test of the HAM:
the amount of processing time should predict the degree of bias or accuracy. Across three experiments we found this was not the case. In addition, we found that even when there was no initial bias (video condition of Experiment 2), raters were still less inclined to believe the speaker by the second and third judgments. These findings question defaultinterventionist or parallel-competition HAM explanations. Pre-emptive conflict resolution models, which claim an early selection of processing routes, could not explain the decline in truth bias either. The types of information available in Experiment 2 (visual, audio, or audio-visual) did not result in the predicted choice of heuristic or analytical processing from the outset. Instead, in all of these experiments the decrease in bias was better predicted by the mere act of making multiple judgments, in line with a step-by-step response mode account. Other research has shown that even at much larger time scales, from 1 to 5 months later, there is a decline in truth bias with subsequent ratings of the speaker's statement (Anderson, DePaulo, & Ansfield, 2002) .
In Experiment 4, we sought to understand why step-by-step responding decreases the truth bias, and found that people use perceived consistency: when the speaker's responses appear inconsistent, raters shift away from a truth-biased position. This finding is in line with previous research. Granhag and Strömwall (2000b) found that 60% of the participants used consistency when rating a speaker's veracity from different statements made by the THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 26 same speaker. Other research also shows that both practitioners and laypersons believe inconsistency indicates deception (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004 ).
Here we found that, across four experiments, perceived inconsistency explained the decrease in truth judgments over the course of the speaker's statement. It seems therefore well established that raters repeatedly judging veracity during a statement make withinstatement comparisons. In addition, we discovered that perceived inconsistency decreases the initial tendency to make truth judgments.
The findings are consistent with truth-default theory (Levine, 2014) , which proposes people default to a truth belief unless they perceive a 'trigger' that leads them to consider the possibility of deception. In the current study, the trigger would be the perceived inconsistency in the statement.
The findings are also consistent with the smart lie detector account (Street & Richardson, in press; Street, 2014 ) that argues people make use of generalised rules (perceived inconsistency) to make informed judgments in low-diagnostic environments. In line with this, we found raters made use of perceived inconsistency, a diagnostic cue in this study. In this sense, it might be considered a smart heuristic (Gigerenzer, Todd & The ABC Research Group, 1999 ).
2
The current findings are not intended to be an all-or-nothing challenge against the HAM account, but rather a piece of the puzzle. One possible limiting factor of the current findings is that we chose to focus on Evans' (2007) taxonomy of HAMs that make temporal predictions. However, analytical processing is not only slower than heuristic processing, but also non-automatic, requiring motivation and cognitive capacity. Other research has examined the role of motivation or cognitive capacity on lie detection or deception THE SOURCE OF THE TRUTH BIAS 27 judgments (e.g., Millar & Millar, 1997; Reinhard & Sporer, 2008 , 2010 Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992) .
Our findings have practical implications both for researchers and lay citizens.
Researchers investigating deception detection should use longer clips, as clips shorter than 87 s (average accumulated time by the end of Response 2) might bias judgments towards truthfulness and might provide a distorted picture of the participants' response tendencies and detection accuracy. Lay people should avoid hasty judgments in assessing veracity because they produce (truth-)biased judgments.
Conclusions
We focused on the processes involved in the truth bias. Truth judgments are often high initially, and then decline progressively over successive ratings. We showed that a HAM-based account could not explain either the initial truth bias or its decline. Instead, the reduced bias was attributable to the act of making multiple judgments, and reflected the use of a simple rule: seemingly inconsistent statements were less likely to be judged as truthful by the point of the second judgment.
Footnote
1 To preserve the continuous nature of the data we also conducted a set of mixed effects model comparisons. The findings mirror those of the ANOVAs. These analyses are available from the first author on request.
2 It is important to note here that a heuristic process, a proposed mechanism that is fast and engages in relatively effortless thought, must be differentiated from a heuristic, a simplified, rule built up from an individual's prior history with the world (Street, 2013) .
The findings suggest the use of a simple heuristic (consistency), but do not support a heuristic processing model. 
